Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| de re, philosophy: statements that refer to non-linguistic objects are de re. Here, most authors assume that the ascribed properties are contingent. An exception is essentialism which ascribes certain necessary properties to objects. See also de dicto, necessity de re, contingency, modality, essentialism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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David K. Lewis on de re - Dictionary of Arguments
IV 49 De re (de dicto/possible world/Lewis: de re: language of our world, events in possible worlds. - de dicto: language from possible world (completely different meaning possible), events in possible world. --- IV 54 De re/Possible world/Lewis: first the denoted thing is identified in the actual real world and then the counterparts are found in the possible world - we do not even look at things that are denoted by subject terms in other possible worlds - de dicto: here we look at things that are designated by subject terms in other possible worlds. --- V 19 De re/Counterfactual conditional/Lewis: E.g. "If Caesar had not crossed the Rubicon, he would never have been the Emperor" - is de re about - "the Emperor" - otherwise wrong: the Emperor would not have been the Emperor - right: "If x hadn’t …, x would not ..." - with that we are referring to the actual Emperor - Important argument: then we could also quantify through counterfactual conditionals (quantification via Counterfactual Conditional): "Every Emperor, who would not have been one, if he had not crossed the Rubicon, will wish in the end that he had crossed the Rubicon" - likewise: E.g. "every match ..." - logical form: were A(x)>> would C(x). Cf. >counterfactual conditionals/Lewis. Potentiality/Lewis: what is it then?_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28